Abstract. Midori128 is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ASI-ACRYPT 2015 to achieve low energy consumption per bit. Currently, the best published impossible differential attack on Midori128 covers 10 rounds without the pre-whitening key. By exploiting the special structure of the S-boxes and the binary linear transformation layer in Midori128, we present impossible differential distinguishers that cover 7 full rounds including the mix column operations. Then, we exploit four of these distinguishers to launch multiple impossible differential attack against 11 rounds of the cipher with the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys.
Introduction
To address the design of lightweight block ciphers having low energy consumption, Banik et al. [1] identified some design choices that are energy efficient and proposed a new family of lightweight block ciphers, namely, Midori. This block cipher follows the SPN design approach and has two variants, Midori128 and Midori64, using a 128-bit secret key and a 128/64-bit block, respectively. Since Midori64 has been completely broken in [2, 3] , in this paper we focus on Midori128. The state of Midori128 has 16 bytes presented as a 4 × 4 matrix. For the linear layer, Midori128 uses an almost MDS binary matrix to optimize the area and signal delay. In order to compensate its low branch number and increase the number of active S-boxes, Midori128 utilizes an optimal cell-permutation layer. In the non-linear layer, Midori128 utilizes a small-delay lightweight 4-bit S-boxes to construct its 8-bit S-box.
While the designers of Midori do not claim resistance under the related, known or chosen-key attack models [1] , a related key attack against the cipher was presented in [4] . In the single-key attack model, the cipher has been analyzed in [5, 6, 7, 8] . In particular, Chen et al. [5] presented 10-round impossible differential attack without the pre-whitening key utilizing a 6-round distinguisher. Later on, Sasaki and Todo [7] proposed a new tool to find impossible differential distinguishers for symmetric-key primitives, and they presented a 7-round distinguisher for Midori128 but the last round in their distingusier contains the sub cell operation only.
In this paper, we improve the previous results of the impossible differential cryptanalysis against Midori128. More specifically, we present several impossible differential distinguishers against Midori128 that cover 7 full rounds (including the linear transformation layer of the the last round). These distinguishers exploit the structure of the S-boxes that are used in Midori128 along with the binary nature of the mix column operation. In particular, we exploit that each S-box of the 4 different 8-bit S-boxes that are used in Midori128 is composed of two 4-bit S-boxes (see Fig. 1 ). Then, we choose differences that activate only one of these 4-bit S-boxes to find such distinguishers. Then, using four of these impossible differential distinguishers, we present 11-round multiple impossible differential attack against Miroi128 including the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys.^^ď 
Specifications of Midori128
Midori128 follows the Substitution Permutation Networks (SPNs) structure iterating over 20 rounds. Each round, except the last one, consists of S-layer (SubCell), P -layer (ShuffleCell and MixColumn) and a key-addition layer (KeyAdd). The last round contains only the S-layer. Moreover, before the first and after the last rounds, pre-whitening and post-whitening are performed using WK. In what follows, we show how these operations update the 128-bit state S.
-SubCell: A nonlinear layer applies one of four 8-bit S-boxes, namely SSb 0 , SSb 1 , SSb 2 , and SSb 3 , on each byte of the state S in parallel, where
As shown in Fig. 1 
-KeyAdd: 128-bit round key RK i is XORed with the state S.
Key Schedule. The pre-whitening and post-whitening keys WK in Midori128 are the master key K, the round keys
, where β i is a constant.
The following notations are used throughout the rest of the paper:
The 128-bit input to the SubCell, ShuffleCell, MixColumn and KeyAdd operations, respectively, at round i.
The difference at state x i and byte x i [j], respectively.
7-round Impossible Differential Distinguishers of Midori128
Impossible Differential attacks, proposed independently by Biham et al. [9] and Knudsen [10] aims to find an impossible differential characteristic, i.e., one that occurs with a probability exactly 0 to act as a distinguisher. Then, the obtained distinguisher can be utilized in a key recovery attack by prepending and/or appending additional analysis rounds. Finally, the keys that are used in the analysis rounds to reach the impossible differential distinguisher are considered wrong keys, and hence they are excluded. In order to reduce the data complexity of the attack, multiple impossible differentials can be utilized [11] .
All of our 7-round distinguishers begin with one active byte w 1 [i], 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, such that only the top (resp. bottom) 4 bits of p i mod 4 (w 1 [i]) are active and ends with two active bytes combinations for the positions of i, j, and in each one of these patterns we can activate the top or bottom 4-bit S-box. One of these distinguishers is illustrated in Fig. 2 and is based on the following propositions. Proposition 1. Let ∆ = xx0000xx, where 0 and x denote the inactive and active/inactive bits, respectively, and at least one of the x bits should be active.
The probability of ∆
Proof. This property follows from the structural properties of the S-box, as shown in Fig. 3 . As depicted in this figure, after applying the input bit permutation p 1 , the input of the top 4-bit S-box Sb 1 has the difference xxxx (and hence it is active) while the input of the bottom 4-bit S-box Sb 1 has the difference 0000 (and hence it is inactive). Since the S-box Sb 1 is bijective, a non-zero input difference to the S-box, implies a non-zero output difference. Therefore, the outputs of the top and bottom 4-bit S-boxes Sb 1 have the difference xxxx and 0000, respectively, with probability one. Then, applying the bit permutation p −1
1 makes the output of the 8-bit S-box SSb 1 has the difference pattern ∆. This property is also applicable to SSb
Proposition 2. Let α and β have the same difference pattern ∆ defined in proposition 1, and α is not necessarily equal to β. The input (hexadecimal) difference (0α00, 0000, 0000, 0000) cannot propagate to the output (hexadecimal) difference (0000, 00ββ , 0000, 0000) after complete 7 rounds of Midori128.
Proof. The difference patten of α and β implies that only the top 4-bit S-box Sb 1 of the 8-bit S-box SSb 1 will be active. From the forward direction, the difference pattern α will be preserved until the internal state x 3 . Then applying SSb 0 and SSb 2 on ∆x 3 [4] and ∆x 3 [6] , respectively, will change it in a way that guarantees that the two 4-bit S-boxes are active and applying SSb 1 on ∆x 3 [5] will preserve the difference pattern α (see proposition 1). Then, the differences in the internal state y 3 can be propagated in the same manner until state x 5 that will have only one byte preserving the α difference pattern at ∆y 5 [5] . From the other direction, since ∆x 9 [6] = ∆x 9 [7] and each one of these differences preserve the β difference pattern, ∆z 8 [6] will be equal to ∆z 8 [7] and each one of these resulting differences will preserve the β difference pattern. From proposition 1, applying SSb on ∆y 8 [11] ensures that the top and bottom 4 bits after applying the bit input permutation p 1 of SSb 1 are active. Then, the differences can be propagated in the same manner until state w 5 . From the shuffle and mix column operations, we know that ∆y 5 [3] which means that the bottom 4-bit of p 1 (∆y 5 [5] ) are active. However, from the forward direction, we know that the bottom 4-bit of p 1 (∆y 5 [5] ) are inactive as this byte satisfies the α difference pattern. Therefore, there is a contradiction between the byte ∆y 5 [5] in the forward and backward directions, and hence the whole truncated differential characteristic holds with probability exactly 0. The previous proposition also holds for α and β have the difference pattern 00xxxx00.
In our attack we exploit the following 4 impossible differential distinguishers: (0α00, 0000, 0000, 0000) (0000, 00ββ, 0000, 0000)(α = β = xx0000xx) (1) (0α00, 0000, 0000, 0000) (0000, 00ββ, 0000, 0000)(α = β = 00xxxx00) (2) (0α00, 0000, 0000, 0000) (0000, β00β, 0000, 0000)(α = β = xx0000xx) (3) (0α00, 0000, 0000, 0000) (0000, β00β, 0000, 0000)(α = β = 00xxxx00) (4) As can be seen, all the four distinguishers above begin with one active byte which has only 4 active bits at position 1, and end with two active bytes where each byte has only 4 active bits at the same column. It should be noted that the obtained 24 distinguishers can be categorized into 6 groups, where each group contains 4 patterns similar to the presented above, and anyone of theses groups can be used in our attack instead of the above four distinguishers.
11-round Multiple Impossible Differential of Midori128
In this section, we present an 11-round multiple impossible differential attack against Midori128 involving both the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys, see Fig. 4 . Throughout our analysis, we utilize the following S-box property, which holds for all bijevctive S-boxes: Given two non-zero differences, ∆x and ∆y, in F 256 , the equation: S(x) + S(x + ∆x) = ∆y has one solution on average. In what follows, we describe the details of our attack which is decomposed of 2 phases: a data collection phase, where we generate enough message pairs to exclude the wrong keys involved in the analysis rounds and a key recovery phase, where we use the collected message pairs to identify the key candidates. Data Collection. In this phase, we use the structure technique in order to reduce the data complexity of the attack. Our structure takes all the possible values in bytes 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 while the other bytes take fixed value. Therefore, one structure generates 2 9×8 × (2 9×8 − 1)/2 ≈ 2 143 possible message pairs. Then, we create 4 lists L i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, where each list L i contains the pairs which satisfy the plaintext and ciphertext differences of the i th impossible differential. For example, L 1 is indexed by the bottom 4 bits of p 1 (P [1] ) and the following bytes of the ciphertext C[0, 1, 2, 3, 4 , 1 b , 2, 4, 5 , 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14 , 15] corresponding to L 3 and L 4 , respectively, because we have 8-bit filter on K [7] .
Step 7 For list L 1 (resp. L 2 ), compute ∆x 9 [6, 7] and keep only the keys that make ∆x 9 [6] = ∆x 9 [7] where each one has the xx0000xx (resp. 00xxxx00) difference pattern. [4, 7] and keep only the keys that make ∆x 9 [4] = ∆x 9 [7] and each one has the xx0000xx (resp. 00xxxx00) difference pattern. 
